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I. INTRODUCTION
The following is a report on progress made during the third
quarter of work on NASA Contract No. NASW-2236, whose subject is
the development of a "robot" computer problem solving system.
Our entire effort in this period was devoted to a single theo-
retical investigation, concerning the general properties of be-
havioral systems. The motivation and results of this investiga-
tion will be described below. To summarize, we did not obtain
the sort of results that we might have hoped for in the best
case, but we did gain a great deal of insight into the problems
that are confronting us, and we would certainly regard our
theoretical probing as worthwhile at this early stage of the
project.
A. Motivation
Our immediate motivation arose out of direct experience in
programming the robot simulation. As we mentioned in the pre-
vious Progress Report, we often found it possible to organize
a behavioral routine in several quite different ways, and we
had no theoretical basis on which to decide such choices.
We were further motivated by the fact that certain organi-
zational properties recur with remarkable consistency in large
behavioral systems (computer programs), even in different
systems with very diverse purposes. For example, feedback control
of an external condition is found in many programs, as are means
for coping with the attendant problems of waiting for the con-
dition to become satisfactory, of interrupting some higher
process if the condition goes out of bounds, and so on.
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Other examples include hierarchical organization of processes,
predictive decision-making in the face of uncertainty, and
priority scheduling in cases of competition for limited re-
sources.
 x
These considerations led us to undertake the investigation
of complex behavioral systems in general. Our grandiose ideal
hope was that we might uncover some comprehensive theory, along
with, an attendant notation, which would allow us to describe and
design behavioral systems at will, much as the calculus allows
us to describe and design various physical systems. Certainly
we did not evolve such a general theory, and indeed we now see
some deep reasons why it may not be possible to create one at
all. Still, we have learned a great deal about ways of organ-
izing behavioral systems, and about the circumstances under
which a given organization is appropriate.
B. The Relativity of Behaviora.1 Description
Traditional mathematics arose from the attempt to describe
the physical world. In the last two centuries, man has learned
that this descriptive tool can be turned around and used to
design new physical systems to suit particular needs. In the
case of computer programming languages, the story is the op-
posite: These languages were created in order to enable the
design of computational algorithms, and only later have they
been applied to the description of natural systems. This is
certainly a case in which the solution (computer languages)
supplied the problem (describing behavioral systems). Un-
fortunately, this order of events has led to the common
assumption that computer languages do in fact solve the problem,
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that is that they are an adequate mathematics for describing be-
havioral systems. There may be some difficulties with this as-
sumption.
s
Traditional mathematics will allow an engineer to analyze a
design for a new electronic circuit (say), but it usually will
not lead him to a good design. For this he must rely on experience,
inspiration, or at best on a much more complex sort of mathematical
computation. Thus, in the traditional case, design is basically
an optimizing process, while description is not. We are beginning
to believe that in the case of behavioral systems, this is not
true; rather the problem of describing a behavioral system is also
inherently one of finding a good description,so that describing
behavioral systems is just as much an optimizing process as
designing them.
To see how this might be true, consider a desk calculator,
of the sort that is 100% mechanical. A set of blueprints for
such a machine might tell us all that we could possibly know
about its structure; they might even allow us to build a working
copy of the device ourselves, so that in some sense they consti-
tute a complete description of the calculator. But certainly the
blueprints fail in some fundamental way to tell us how the machine
works, and what it does, for they do not describe any of the oper-
ations that it performs. Here is the apparent paradox: Even a
complete description of the structure of a system may fail to be
a description of its behavior. But what is there left to des-
cribe?
What is left is a set of criteria which exist in the mind
of the (human) recipient of the description. Suppose we under-
take to describe how the calculator divides. To one man we must
say: "You punch in A, press the Divide button, punch in B, and
then press the Equals button." To another man we must say that
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it divides by repeated subtraction. To a third man we must give
a long rigmarole about which ratchets turn which shafts. In
short, there is no answer, no description of "how the machine
divides", except in terms of the questions that the description
is intended to answer. It is in this sense that a description
is not a description unless it is a "good" one.
Now, no doubt this sort of relativity holds trivially for
any descriptive system, but the mere existence of traditional
mathematics proves the existence of broadly agreed-upon, and
therefore implicit, description criteria for physical systems.
Apparently such implicit agreement is lacking when it comes to
behavioral systems, with the consequence that there is no •
canonical description of such a system, and hence no simple
"mathematics" in the traditional sense of a symbolic system which
can be applied descriptively in a straightforward way.
We might remark that the fact that there is no single
"correct" or "true" description of the behavior of a complex
system does not, of course, mean that there is no true substrate
to the behavior. The desk calculator clanks away unconcernedly,
leaving us to puzzle out behavioral notions such as "the
process of division".
We have belabored this section because we feel that it
dominates the rest of our discussion. Indeed, if the intuitions
expressed here are correct, then it may never be possible to find
the sort of calculus of behavioral organization that we set out
in search of. Still, we believe that there are fruitful ways
of proceeding, as we will describe in the next section.
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C. A Piecemeal Approach
Failing in our grander motivation, we should retreat to
our secondary motivation, namely the observed commonality of
organizational devices in widely differing behavioral computer
systems. Concepts like "interrupt", "backtracking", "executive",
and so on are known to be important, and they will not disappear
on us like the notion of a general calculus of behavioral
organization. Therefore, as a first step we have set out to
examine such concepts piecemeal - that is, without any attempt
at synthesis. By concentrating on these concepts, we can gain
useful insights into important behavioral mechanisms, and at the
same time we can slowly flush out the underlying relationships
among various aspects of behavioral organization.
5.
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II. ASPECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIOR
A. Hierarchical Organization of Processes
Any behavior that we observe must unfold linearly with time;
why then should we describe or design a behavioral system in
terms of a hierarchy of processes? Why do we not represent every
system simply as a linear sequence of actions? The reason, evi-
dently, is that we are able to see significant recurring patterns
in a linear sequence of events, and we attribute the appearance
of similar sub-sequences to the presence of a single "sub-
process". That is, we form the concepts of individual sub-
processes, such as "squaring a number" or "grasping an object",
by induction over time, in precisely the same manner that we
form object-concepts such as "dog" or "sunset". The nesting of
process-concepts gives us the same sort of hierarchy that we
have in the case of object-concepts, where "collie" is a sub-
concept of "dog", which is a sub-concept of "mammal".
Because of our experience with hierarchically structured
systems (e.g. computer programs and human management structures),
we tend to think of hierarchical behavioral organization as
being similarly "real", i.e. part of the mechanism that actually
generates the behavior. This need not necessarily be the case.
For example, we can take any activity, such as "grasping an
object", and break it down into further ones, such as "opening
the hand", "orienting the hand", "moving the hand to the object",
etc.; but this analysis does not mean that grasping actually
proceeds in phases. The activity could be entirely preprogrammed
and integrated, or it could be organized in some very different
way. (Recall the example of the desk calculator: Its "behavior"
is not the same thing as its "mechanism".)
6.
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Thus, the act of temporal induction, and hence the descrip-
tion in terms of a hierarchy, come from us, and not necessarily
from the system that we are describing. This relativity implies
that the level of detail and the descriptive particulars in a
hierarchical representation depend on the needs of the person
performing the induction, and not on absolute properties of the
behavior in question. This fact is familiar to any programmer,
who must continually decide whether or not a sequence of actions
is.<worth encapsulating as a closed subroutine.
B
* Branch Points and Information
One of the major problems in induction is what to do with
event sub-sequences which are similar but not identical. An im-
portant solution is the use of branch points to allow some ele-
ments of a sequence to be collapsed while others remain distinct,
For example, suppose that a system has been observed to emit
activities A, B, X, and Y, in the following sequence:
. . . A B X A B Y A B Y A B X A B Y A B X A B X A B X A B Y . . ,
We might well represent this system by a finite-state device:
X
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Here, the state after the emission of B constitutes a branch
point, where the system "decides" whether to emit an X or a Y.
This use of the word "decides" is critically important. It is a
prime example of a behavioral imputation that need not correspond
to any mechanism actually used by the system that we are des-
cribing. In other words, when our inductive analysis leads us
to postulate a branch point, we also postulate a decision process.
Furthermore, we inevitably go on to ask on what basis the
decision was made. We ask what information goes into determining
the choice at the branch point. For example, our finite-state
machine above becomes understandable if we assert that after
emitting a B, it reads a symbol off of a tape; if the symbol is
1, it emits an X, if it is 0, the machine emits a Y. Thus, we
identify the influence of information with (apparent) choice.
This is, of course, a fundamental intuition of formal information
theory; we see here that it is just as fundamental in understanding
the organization of behavior.
Sometimes it is the apparent seeking of information that
leads us to postulate a branch point, rather than the other way
around. For example, when a cat carefully scans a ledge before
jumping onto it, we assume that he is deciding precisely how he
can execute the jump, if at all.
Although the postulation of branch points does not force a
hierarchical organization (as the finite-state representation
demonstrates), the two are very importantly related. One simple
way of seeing this is to think of a behavioral "parsing tree"
such as the following, for the sequence on the previous page:
8.
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(The arc indicates an "AND" node; the lower node is an "OR" node.)
It is extremely convenient to imagine that there is some entity,
some decision process, associated at each branch point, and that
this entity ".supervises" the activities that are found below it.
In the case of an "OR" branching, the supervisor of course makes
the decision of which branch should be taken. In the case of an
"AND" branching, the supervisor at least decides when one phase
should end and the next commence (which is sometimes a non-trivial
problem in complex systems like our robot).
We suspect that such postulated decision processes dr super-
visors are the essence of behavioral representation. Certainly
our remaining sections will all revolve about this concept.
C. Spheres of^Influence
Once we have postulated a hierarchy of supervisors, it is
natural to think of them in terms of the managerial structure
of a human organization. While there are a number of inade-
quacies to this metaphor, it can be quite instructive. We think
of a human supervisor as having certain "sphere of influence."
This includes the agents "below" him whose work he controls,
and the administrators above him who specify and evaluate his
own work. It is important to note that the supervisor's world,
that is, his sources of information, are local, being restricted
to the nearby realms above and below him. Of course, there is
no precise definition of "local"; what is important is that
some information is harder for the supervisor to come by than
other information.
To give an important example, let us consider the case of
a man sitting in his living room watching t.v. who suddenly
9.
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desires a can of beer. At some peripherally conscious level, he
realizes that he must get up, go into the kitchen, and open the
refrigerator in order to get a can of beer. In order to get up,
he calls upon a skilled activity involving placing both feet on
the floor, bending forward at the waist, placing his hands on the
arms of the chair, etc. In order to place a foot on the floor,
perhaps specific neural circuits are used, containing internal
feedback loops to ensure smooth control of the muscles. Now,
what interests us is that the near-conscious supervisor has not
the slightest idea of how the muscles are moved, while the
muscular circuits have not the slightest idea of the desirability
of beer. (By a valid analogy, a corporation president and a
laborer for the corporation have no idea of each other's tasks.)
Putting this in terms of information and decisions, we can say
that the near-conscious planner is not capable of making any
decisions on the basis of signals from individual muscles, and
the-muscular control circuits are not capable of making any
choices based on needs or knowledge involving beer.
Many of the hardest problems in designing the robot control
system arise from precisely such disjoint spheres of influence.
At one level the robot decides to look at a particular building,
but the eye was already being moved in the other direction for a
different reason, and besides the building in question is too far
behind the robot to be seen any more. Such problems of coordina-
tion are basic to any behavioral system which is sufficiently
ramified to contain supervisors with non-intersecting spheres
of influence. We v/ill return to the matter of coordination after
examining one more fundamental notion.
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D. Goals
Perhaps the most tenuous concept involved in the description
of behavior is that of "goal". Even more than the other notions
that we have discussed, the idea of a "goal" is clearly a des-
criptive artifact. The desk calculator clunks along perfectly
well with no goals driving any of its gears or pinions. We
have found no single answer to the question of the proper role
for the concept of goals, but we are beginning to have some ideas
as to where it fits into the scheme of things.
If we consider our hierarchy of supervisors or executives,
we realize that the administrative tasks performed by these enti-
ties (tasks such as keeping track of which subordinates are doing
what) are distinct from the overall task of the system. That is,
the manager of a steel mill pushes papers, but his ultimate re-
sponsibility is to produce steel. We may suggest that the notion
of "goal" arises precisely when we have such a separation between
an ultimate responsibility and the administrative work required
to meet that responsibility. In straightforward behaving systems,
where there is no such separation, we do not need to postulate
goals. For example, the engine of an automobile drives the
wheels, period — we do not need to say that it has the goal of
driving the wheels.
Of course, the designer of the automobile had the goal of
making the wheels go around, which is why he supplied the car
with an engine. For this reason, it does not sound nonsensical
to say that the goal of the engine is to drive the wheels, but
in saying so we are merely including the human into the system
that we are describing. This would be made clearer by a care-
ful linguistic distinction: We should say that the purpose of
11.
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the engine is to drive the wheels; of itself, the engine has no
goals.
To take an example at the opposite end of the spectrum, sup-
pose that a man decides to discover a cure for cancer by next
February. Here we have the ultimate separation between the end
product of a system and the procedure for obtaining it, namely
there is no known procedure for obtaining it. In this case, the
only useful description of the man's behavior is in terms of a
goal.
We see, then, that the notion of goal is a function of the
way in which a behavior is described. We should be very careful
about postulating goals as a mechanism of the behavior itself.
This comment applies specifically to the new goal-oriented
programming languages, and to some of our own programming on the
robot simulation.
It is common to talk of goals in terms of states. Even in
terms of the cancer example, such a notion seems artificial: the
man's goal is to do something, namely discover a cure, not to be
in the state of having discovered a cure. Also, we may think of
organisms whose behavior is commonly described in terms of
tropisms: the worm's goal is to move toward water, away from
light. Here we may salvage the notion of state by speaking in
terms of gradients, but we should be aware that we are embalming
time- or space- derivatives in what is supposedly a static des-
cription. Thus, it is unduly restrictive to think of goals only
in terms of states.
Goals, too, are things that are desirable. What does this
mean? Perhaps it means that what a system wants, or what it
wants to do, defines its goals? A certain amount of programming
experience or philosophical reflection will show that such an
analysis is tautological. We must admit that what a system does
12.
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is identical with our (often post hoc) imputation of goals.
However, this identity does not render the concept of
"desirability" meaningless. We suspect that this concept can
be usefully related to that of expenditure of resources. Suppose
that on a Sunday a man has to choose between going fishing or
mowing the lawn. We observe him to be packing up his fishing
gear. We therefore say that he has selected the goal of doing
some fishing, this being (ipso facto) the more desirable
alternative. If it had been possible for the man to do both
activities at the same time, the description in terms of goals
would have been much less useful. Therefore, ultimately the
notion of goal brings us right back to the notion of branching,
of decision.
E. Resource Conflicts
As the foregoing discussion indicated, there is a close
connection between decisions and limitations of resources. If
a system had unlimited resources of all sorts, it would still
have to make decisions involving coordination (see the next two
sections), but many of its organizational problems would disappear.
This is strikingly clear in the case of our robot simulation,
where much of the subtlety arises from the fact that the robot is
capable of entertaining many simultaneous hypotheses about the
world, but it must check them out serially because of the focal
nature of visual attention. (This is not to implv that focal
attention is internationally inefficient; on the contrary, it is
rich in informational benefits, but these come at a high
organizational cost to the system that employs focal mechanisms.)
The resource limitation which is most familiar to computer
programmers is that of "processing power", i.e. the enforced
serial nature of most of our machines. When a process has "AND-ed"
subprocesr>es, we tend to think of them as sequential steps;' when
13.
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a process has "OR-ed" subprocesses, we worry about the order in
which they should be tried until one of them succeeds. It is
important to note that these primary concerns of the programmer
are in fact artifacts of serial processing in our computers (and
perhaps of serial analysis in our conscious thought). In human
managerial systems, and in biological nervous systems, there is
.ample opportunity for simultaneous activity among processes at
the same level. In such cases, the notions of "AND-ed" or
"OR'ed" subprocesses merge into each other, and we must find
new bases for describing the activity of the supervisor. The
next two sections will suggest some principles that may be useful.
An important fact about resource conflict is that it may
cut across the sphere-of-influence boundaries of individual local
supervisors. For example, in our robot simulation, no matter
what is the hierarchical relationship of various processes that
may wish to move the eye, there is onlv one eye, and all must
compete for it. It follows that the entity which allocates such
a resource cannot have its sphere of influence confined to any
sub-locality; therefore, it must become a global decision-maker.
This seems to us to be an extraordinarilv powerful conclusion.
It seems to mean that a system, no matter how homogeneous its
elements (e.g.. a nervous system), cannot have a homogeneous
behavioral structure if contains conflict over resources. There
must be some mechanism which allows the attainment and enforcement
of a global decision as to the allocation of the resource. We
might even suggest that, according to this argument, the anpearance
of a unitary "mind" is unavoidable (albeit at the level of
behavioral description) in any system with a high ratio of
potential behaviors to bodily resources.
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behavioral description) in any system with a high ratio of
potential behaviors to bodily resources.
F. Condition Conflicts^
More general than resource conflicts are the problems that
arise when two supervisors of independent subprocesses have
incompatible requirements as to the state of the world. To air
condition your house, the windows must be closed; to ventilate
it, they must be open; therefore you cannot do both at once.
In an algorithmically-behaving system, especially a
sequential one, the initial design of the system assures in
advance that the preconditions for a given subprocess will be
met at the time that the process is called for. The more potent,
the more adaptive a system becomes, the more its organization
must explicitly cope with the meeting of preconditions before a
subprocess can be unleashed. Perhaps the ultimate of such
organization is a collection of independent "demons", which are
subprocesses that themselves actively "monitor" their preconditions,
and autonomously commence their activity as soon as their
conditions are met. This "pandemonium" organization is powerful
because of its inherent parallelism, but in most cases it must
be combined with some sort of executive mechanism which will
provide the requisite administrative (global) control. In order
to see how such hybrid organizations function, we must gain an
understanding of some of the more basic elements of the condition
conflict problem.
We often think of "conditions" in terms of predicates which
are either true or false. There are a number of reasons why
this conception is inadequate. Many conditions (such as spatial
position) take on a range of values, which may well be continuous.
In many cases it is worthwhile to consider both the value of
some measurable quantity (e.g. intensity of a stimulus) and its
15.
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time-derivative; this complicates the specification of a
"condition" involving such a quantity. Often in real systems,
the value of a condition can be obtained only to some degree of
certainty less than 1.0 ; in such cases there must be a balance
between the overhead of ascertaining the condition and the chance
of making an erroneous decision. Even worse is the problem of
the possible variation in a condition over time. That is, the
system cannot afford to monitor all conditions at all times, but
conditions may have, changed in the interval since they were last
observed (with some conditions being more likely to change than
others). . This latter has come to be known as the "frame problem";
clearly it must be solved in terms of "expected truth values",
rather than with binary true-false predicates.
These kinds of problems are compounded whenever the system
takes any overt action, because then it produces some not-wholly-
predictable change in the world. In general, the possibility
that any one subprocess will change the preconditions for anv
other (either favorably or unfavorably) can be computed only in
terms of expected probability, since a system has only a partial
knowledge of the world, and only limited time to spend predicting
the consequences of its actions. Of course, it is precisely this
sort of uncertainty which underlies the importance of sensory
feedback. If you want to know whether or not your elbow is
resting in your coffee cup, don't figure it out — take a look.
Or, even better, have "passive" sensors which can interrupt an
action if it results in the placement of your elbow in the coffee.
The notion of interrupt relates back to the idea of a
"demon" silently watching until a certain condition is met, but
it further implies the power of one subprocess to halt or at
least influence another. Once this vital concept is allowed,
our intuitive ability to comprehend the control organization of
a complex behavioral system goes from poor to abysmal. This is
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just the point at which we would like to have a workable
mathematical representation, but at the moment we must be content
with an informal examination of the concepts that such a mathe-
matics must represent.
G. Temporal Organizatiqn_
The problems of condition conflict can be looked at from a
temporal as well as from a logical point of view. In a sequential
system, each subprocess is invoked only when the previous one is
complete, at the behest of the administrating superprocess. In
a pandemonium system, the temporal interaction is more complex,
with the demons "waiting" in some kind of limbo status until they
get an opportunity to perform, perhaps interrupting some other
demons in the process. In all of this there is still one element
lacking: What sets the pace, what determines the global temporal
organization of events? This can be made into a fairly deep
question.
In many computer programs, the question of pace is totally
irrelevant. For example, suppose we are given the mathematical
2
relation X = (Y + 2*Z) . This relation is inherently atemporal.
Now consider a sequential program for computing X in terms of
Y and Z:
(1) X <- 7.
(2) X + 2*X
(3) X «- Y + X
(4) X <- X*X
It does not matter how fast this program is run. All that matters
is that the steps be performed in order; this is what determines
the equivalence between the program and the formula.
The situation is of course entirely different for a system
that must interact with the real world. If any one subprocess
has a temporal extension, then the others must be placed in some
temporal relationship to it. We can think of several ways of
17.
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achieving such temporal coordination, each with its advantages
and disadvantages. It is possible to define a global time-scale,
"clock time", against which all activities are mapped out. It
is possible to specify events in relative time; e.g., B happens
five seconds after A, but C is temporally independent. It is
possible to control a process in terms of the rate at which it
proceeds. And it is possible to regard time as one of the
preconditions to the commencement or branching of a process:
e.g. one subprocess could take a certain branch if another
subprocess had run for such-and-such a period, or if the clock
time were such-and-such. No one of these devices is adequate for
all purposes, and certainly all are used in effecting the time-
coordination of human affairs.
We feel that time is less understood relative to its
importance than any other aspect of behavioral organization.
This is especially true in regard to simultaneous processes, which
are just beginning to receive formal study. For example, the
notion of monitoring, and of the supervision of one process by
another are most clearly exemplified when the supervisor and the
supervisee are functioning at the same time. Clearly this and
similar concepts are crucial to the organization of process
control.
H. Executive Bookkeeping
One of the functions of a supervisor is to keep track of
what is going on among its subordinate processes. In current
programming systems, subprocesses are usually run sequentially,
they terminate of their own accord, and their success or failure
is evaluated only after they terminate. Even in so straight-
forward a case, the supervisor may require considerable bookkeep-
ing in order to keep track of what has and what has not been
done. The problem grows very complicated if the supervisor is
18.
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to gain anything from attempts which fail. There is the problem
of computing which portion of the acquired hard-knock experience
was a function of the particular approach that was tried, and
which experience is relevant to any further approach that might
be tried. Ultimately, this is a form of the frame problem,
solvable only by estimation.
The notions of "success" and "failure" should be treated
gingerly, since we would like to distinguish between goals which
are explicit to the supervisory process, versus those which are
implicit in the organization of the system (e.g., in our little
2
program for computing (Y + 2*Z) , all goals are implicit, and
the supervisor has only to make sure that the steps are executed
one after the other, since they automatically "succeed" and
"terminate"). Of course, it is even harder to define when a
process is "succeeding" or "failing", in terms of a measure of
progress, yet this must be done in any system where processes
cannot be expected to terminate themselves automatically (e.g.
the search for an item in a large memory store).
The notion of "backtracking" in case of a failure is subject
to complexities, even in case failure is well-defined, and even
disregarding the problem of learning something from the failure.
It presupposes that there is in fact a record somewhere of what
was being tried (this is not automatically the case in a
pandemonium-like system). Also, the problem of diagnosing where
to place responsibility for the failure may be effectively
insoluable in cases where the chain of command passes through
several disjoint spheres of influence. For example, if our
beer-seeking t.v. watcher finds that he cannot move his foot
(perhaps it is asleep), the analysis of the situation and cor-
rective action must be made at a very much higher level than that
at which the failure actually occurred. Thus, recovering from
a failure may be a challenging exercise both in bookkeeping and
decision-making finesse.
19.
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I. Executive Decision-Making
Given that the supervisor can keep track of what its
subordinates are doing, in most systems it must allocate
"processing power" or some other resource to them on a merit/
basis. Presumably the most meritorious course of action is
that which will produce the best or most results with the lowest
expenditure of resource (including time). Of course, the
question is how the supervisor is to know ahead of time, in a
non-algorithm-like system, how to estimate the effectiveness
and expense of the various alternatives that are presented to it.
It is tricky to define how a supervisor can predict or estimate
the behavior of a subprocess without of course carrying out the
actual execution of the subprocess.
We should also mention that the very generation of alternative
subprocesses may be a task that consumes non-negligible resources.
For example, if the robot (or an animal) is confronted with a
visual scene, it must match that scene with long-term memory in
order to draw out hypotheses by which it may recognize parts of
the scene. This match-search of memory is a major part of the
recognition process, and the system obviously cannot afford to
draw all possible hypotheses out of memory before testing any of
them. Thus, part of the executive responsibility is to generate
new potential subprocesses in a manner which is efficient, as
well as efficiently managing the subprocesses which have already
been proposed.
This sort of executive decision-making is perhaps the crux
of efficient behavior. At the same time, it is relatively simple
conceptually (if stated as a choice among alternatives), and
relatively well-studied by traditional means (e.g. statistical
decision theory). Therefore we will go no further into the
mechanisms of decision-making here, since our object is to consider
the structure of the behavioral system as a whole. And while it
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might be relatively simple to enumerate the criteria for any
individual decision, it is usually not so simple to specify how
such decisions should interact, how supervisors should coordinate
and decide priority among themselves, what spheres of influence
should be open to each supervisor, and so forth.
J. Deciding the Overall Organization: Statistical^ Information
The question of overall organization, as we asserted in the
introduction, is one of optimizing with respect to certain goals,
whether one is describing a given behavioral system or designing
a new one. Thus, in many cases the finding of a good formali-
zation is substantially a different problem from the finding of
any one that will work at all. The optimization must take into
account the system's behavior over a large class of similar
inputs; that is, it is essentially an inductive process. For
example, suppose that you are introduced to a person, and that
he reacts moodily to your attempts to talk about football. From
this one event, you have no idea whether the problem is that he
hates football, or that he hates introductions, or that he was
having a bad day, or that he is generally a surly person. These
possibilities can be distinguished only by observing him in a
number of similar situations. It is easy to see that the same
sort of procedure is necessary for arriving at the proper
description of any complex behavioral system.
We would like to emphasize that the information gathered in
such experimentation with a behavioral system is statistical in
nature, and that therefore the selection of an optimum model of
a behavioral system is closely connected to the statistics of
its responses to typical inputs. This fact has been implicit in
everything we have said about alternative organizations of
systems. For example, if subprocess B is always both desirable
and possible after the execution of subprocess A, then the best
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organization is to make them sequential steps under some larger
process. If the applicability of B depends on some particular
set of conditions, it might be best to provide a test on those
conditions, with the execution of B being dependent on this test.
If B is only rarely applicable, or if the circumstances of its
applicability are not readily predictable from tests, it might
be best to establish B as a "demon" which independently waits
and watches for its opportunity to proceed.
Thus, the proper organization of a particular behavior is
entirely dependent on the particular statistical peculiarities
of the task at hand. This is true of the global organization,
and of the details of control throughout the system. Furthermore, ,
there are some problems, such as the handling of the "frame
problem" mentioned in Section II.F, which have solutions only in
terms of a statistical conformity of the system to its informational
environment. Perhaps this ubiquitous influence of the statistical
properties of the task is the most important general principle
that can be stated about the organization of behavioral systems.
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III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The discussions that we have set forth in the previous
section of course fall far short of a general theory of
behavioral organization, but we believe that they do shed light
on some of the important issues which such a theory should
encompass. While the results of our research are not yet unified,
they still serve to deepen our understanding of many problems
that arise in the design of our robot simulation system. They
also allow us to relate the robot system intelligently to progress
made in the creation of other large systems, such as speech
understanding, air traffic control, biomedical simulation, and
computer network systems. It was the potential for constructive
interaction among these projects that provided much of the initial
motivation for our theoretical investigations.
At present, we feel that we have pushed theory as far as it
can go without further practice. Therefore, in the next period
we will return to the goals of establishing particular behaviors
in our robot simulation, as described in the previous Progress
Reports. In particular, we will be directing our attention to
the problem of a proper internal representation for the robot's
experience, such that the robot can use this representation in
order to recognize where it is by reference to the visual scenery.
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